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ABSTRACT 
· For the last two decades, the United States and Iran have fostered a relationship of 
.. 
enmity and distrust. The United States imposes sanctions against the Islamic Republic, in 
an effort 'to isolate the regime and limit its ability to finance terrorist activity or to 
develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Since 1996, however, Iran has 
undertaken a diplomatic "charm offensive" aimed at opening up to regional rivals and to 
the international community. It has sent some signals that it seeks to distance itself from 
terrorism and from antagonistic relations with its neighbors. Its burgeoning relations 
with Europe has left America alone in its implementation of sanctions, and has put 
Washington at odds with its European partners. 
This thesis looks more closely at the nature of U.S. policy against Iran, 
examining key issues with regard to its conventional and unconventional security posture, 
the regional security environment that defines that posture, and the linkage between 
Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its sponsorship of extremist 
organizations such as Hizballah. It argues that Iran has legitimate security concerns that 
drive its current foreign policy. In this context, there may be room for rapprochement 
with Tehran. 
v 
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U.S. policy on Iran is rooted in preventing the Islamic Republic from proliferating 
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the advent of the Islamic regime in 1979, 
Iran has been the subject of unilateral sanctions by the United States, despite sentiment 
from Western partners that sanctions are counterproductive and ineffective. 
Washington's goal is to foster regional stability, prevent extremist groups that Iran 
sponsors from acquiring such weapons, and to ensure the free flow of oil through the 
Persian Gulf. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has been 
viewd as a dangerous and destabilizing entity in the Middle East. If not for Saddam 
Hussein, Iran would still be perceived as the most dangerous state in the region. Viewed 
from this perspective, Washington is quite right in its commitment to preventing a 
weapons buildup in Iran, as well as its attempts at diplomatic isolation of the country. 
However, Iran's history with its neighbors and with the West provides incentive 
for Tehran to pursue conventional and unconventional capability. I argue the following: 
• Iran has a history of insecurity, dating back to the Shah. This has · 
contributed to a "siege mentality" in Iran. Its borders have been 
infiltrated, militarily and politically, from expansionist Communism to 
Western oil .cartels, to hegemonic neighbors with significant WMD 
capability. 
• The inordinate expense and lack of technical expertise inside Iran may 
limit its ability to pursue a substantial nuclear inventory. This explains 
Tehran's retention of a chemical weapons inventory - the "poor man's 
nuclear bomb" - since they are relatively inexpensive. Comparison with 
other Gulf countries will place its conventional military buildup in 
perspective, and will show that, while it remains a dominant military 
power in the Gulf, its spending trends remain comparable to its neighbors. 
• Iran is a sponsor of international terrorism, especially to Palestinian 
groups such as Hizballah and Hamas. U.S. policy links Iran's 
unconventional weapons buildup to terrorism, by implying that such a 
Xl 
capability provides these groups accesst to nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons. None of these groups have a history of chemical weapons use, 
however, despite the fact that Iran has had such capability since the 1980s. 
I argue that the WMD threat posed by these groups must be analyzed in 
terms of the group's organization, ideology, aspirations and operational 
history. These factors, as well as the political issues imposed by state 
sponsorship, constrain the activities of groups such as Hizballah, relative 
to apocalyptic counterparts such as Aum Shinrikyo, which launched a 
chemical attack in 1995. 
• Finally, sanctions have served to isolate the United States, not Iran. They 
are not popular with America's allies, who perceive of the sanctions as 
ineffective and a violation of their sovereignty. An open relationship with 
Iran could allow the United States to shape the future of Iran's WMD 
capability, rather than alienate us from our allies and foment an already 
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U. S. policy on Iran is rooted in preventing the Islamic Republic from 
proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the advent of the Islamic 
regime in 1979, Iran has been the subject of unilateral sanctions by the United States, 
"without multilateral support, which if nothing else makes Iran an interesting case study 
of the use of sanctions when the United States disagrees with its allies about how to 
proceed."! These sanctions have been modified and extended, and have included the 
following: 
• Following the November 1979 embassy takeover in Tehran, President 
Carter made it illegal for Americans to purchase goods directly from Iran, 
and froze $12 billion in Iranian assets in the U.S, In 1980, he extended the 
sanctions, to include a ban on all commerce and travel between Iran and 
the United States. 
• Between 1984 and 1987, restrictions on economic ties with Iran increased 
following then-Secretary of State Schultz 1s designation of Iran as a 
supporter of international terrorism. 
• On October 6, 1987 Congress passed resolutions calling for a ban on all 
Iranian imports. President Reagan signed an executive order prohibiting 
nearly all imports from Iran. 
• In November 1991, President George Bush returned $285 million of the 
frozen Iranian assets in the United States. Nothing came of Washington's 
offers to meet quietly with Iranian officials, however. 
• The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 extended restrictions on 
U.S. exports to Iran. It also included mandatory sanctions against foreign 
governments aiding Iran in proliferating weapons of mass destruction, as 
well as "a ban on sale ... of items on the U.S. Munitions List, suspension of 
I Patrick Clawson, "Iran," in Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy ed. Richard N. Haass (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 85. 
1 
dual-use technical exchange agreements, and an end to any economic 
aid."2 
• On August 5, 1996 President Clinton signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions 
Act of 1996 (ILSA, also called the D' Amato Act after its sponsor, 
Republican Senator Alfonse D' Amato). It targets only investment in 
Iranian oil and gas development in excess of $20 million. 
• In August 1997, despite some speculation that U.S.-Iran relations might 
improve, President Clinton issued a new executive order banning U.S. 
exports to third countries "when the goods are destined for reexport to 
Iran."3 
The goal is to foster regional stability, prevent state-sponsored terrorists from 
acquiring such weapons, and to ensure the free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf. 
Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has been viewed as a 
dangerous and destabilizing entity in the Middle East. If not for Saddam Hussein, Iran 
would still be perceived as the most dangerous state in the region. These issues, quite 
rightly, have forced the United States to be firm in its commitment to preventing a 
weapons buildup in Iran. 
However, Iran's history with its neighbors and with the West provides incentive 
for the Islamic Republic to pursue conventional and unconventional weapons capability. 
I argue the following: 
• Iran has a history of insecurity, dating back to the Shah. This 
contributed to a "siege mentality" in Iran. Its borders have been 
infiltrated militarily and politically, from expansionist Communism to 
Western oil cartels, to hegemonic neighbors with significant WMD 
capability. 
2 Ibid., 86. 





• However, given the inordinate expense involved in acquiring nuclear 
weapons, the Iranian economy may limit Tehran's ability to pursue a 
substantial inventory. This explains Tehran's retention of a chemical 
weapons inventory, since they are relatively inexpensive. Comparison 
with other Gulf countries, however, indicates that Iran is not pursuing 
a massive military buildup, conventional or otherwise. While it 
remains a dominant power in the Persian Gulf, its spending trends 
remain comparable to its neighbors'. 
• Iran is a historic sponsor of international terrorism, especially to 
Palestinian groups such as Hizballah and Hamas. U.S. policy links 
Iran's weapons buildup to terrorism, by implying that such a capability 
provides these groups access to weapons of mass destruction. None of 
these groups have a history of chemical weapons use, however, despite 
the fact that Iran has had such capability since the 1980s. Why? I 
argue that the WMD threat posed by these groups must be analyzed in 
terms of the group's organization, ideology, aspirations, and 
operational history. State sponsorship constrains the activities of such 
groups as Hizballah, relative to apocalyptic counterparts such as Aum 
Shinrikyo, which launched a chemical attack in 1995. 
• Sanctions have served to isolate the United States, not Iran. They are 
not popular· with America's allies, who perceive the sanctions as 
ineffectual and a violation of their sovereignty. An open relationship 
with Iran could allow the United States to shape the nature of Iran's 
WMD capability, rather than alienate us from our allies and foment an 
already festering enmity toward the West in the region. 
International relations theory fonns the framework for my first argument. I draw 
mainly from the security dilemma theory put forward by Robert Jervis, and the regional 
security analysis provided by Zeev Maoz. This will provide some insight into an 
insecurity that was borne not out of the Islamic Revolution, but one which goes back to 
the 1950's, to the height of the Cold War, when a young Mohammed Reza Shah sought 
U.S. patronage in order to satisfy his own security needs. Iran is distinct in that, from a 
security standpoint, it experienced two distinct revolutionary periods during the twentieth 
century. The first was the post-colonial experience, when it first struggled to establish 
3 
sovereignty and with it security; the second was the post-Islamic Revolution experience, 
when it established new rules for foreign and domestic policy. At both times, the new 
regime had to provide for the security for the state. I believe that historical perspective 
will offer some insight as to why Iran pursues the foreign and security policies that it 
does. 
The second argument requires an examination of recent trends in conventional as 
well as unconventional proliferation, in comparison to the rest of the Gulf. Chapter three 
examines the military balance in the Gulf, in an effort to shed further light on the real 
motivation behind Iran's proliferation efforts. Iran and Iraq stand as the two powers in 
the Persian Gulf. This notwithstanding, evidence indicates that Iran now places far less 
emphasis on a massive conventional military buildup. Further, domestic economic 
pressures coupled with the need for Iran to drastically improve or replace existing 
inventories may prohibit the country from seeking a rapid buildup. 
Still, Iran continues to pursue WMD capability, including chemical and 
biological. Such technology is far cheaper than its nuclear counterpart, even if it is not as 
"glamorous," and Iran has demonstrated its ability to develop and employ such weapons. 
. . 
While chapter two seeks to answer why Iran pursues such a security posture, chapter 
three seeks to place Iran's WMD pursuits in proper perspective, and further examines the 
real nature of the military balance in the Gulf. We should ask ourselves whether Iran 
possesses a significant ~litary advantage over its neighbors, not only in terms of 
quantity, in terms of quality - in technology, maintenance, and personnel. Just as 
important, in terms of Iran's aggregate proliferation capacity, is Iran's desire for such 
weapons part of a policy of substitution for a strong conventional military, given the 
4 
current state of its army? From an economic standpoint, Iran's proliferation may be 
driven by rational concerns of cost. It may, in fact, be more economical to procure such 
weapons than it is to rebuild its conventional forces. 
Third, I argue that a key concern for Washington is the prospects for 
unconventional weapons falling into the hands of "terrorists." Iran remains on 
Washington's list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the availability of weapons of mass 
destruction inside Iran poses the threat of such weapons becoming part of the arsenal of 
such groups as Hizballah and Hamas, both of which have historically been sponsored by 
Iran. This poses grave implications, not only for the security of the Persian Gulf, but for 
the Middle East peace process, which is already in dire straits. Both groups are firmly 
against the process, and the availability of such weapons could give them a powerful role 
in forestalling future negotiations. 
Iran began its chemical and biological weapons programs in 1987, making such 
weapons available to groups such as Hizballah, which was established in 1982 during the 
Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. None of these groups show a history of using 
such weapons, particularly in the context of regional security. Key factors as to why 
these groups have not opted for the WMD threat may include the very nature of their 
relationship with the states that sponsor them. Hizballah, in particular, provides an 
interesting case, given that it is was most directly established by Iran, and ·has received 
much of its training and financing from Tehran. When compared to apocalyptic groups 
like Aum Shinrikyo or "freelancers" such as Osama bin Laden's al-Qa'ida, Hizballah 
clearly does not have the incentive of freedom of activity of its counterparts. Chapter IV 
5 
looks more closely at these groups, and assesses the real threat of whether Iranian 
proliferation means terrorist proliferation. 
Finally, we can make a point that a closer relationship with Iran would allow the 
United States greater ability to shape the nature of Iran's military capacity. America's 
current policy isolates, not Iran, but America. States Jahangir Amuzegar, "Washington 
has tried and failed to enlist its major allies in its campaign against Iran. "4 The European 
Union, Japan, even some of its partners in the region regard American sanctions against 
Iran as unrealistic and ineffective. Most of the allies have pursued a more pragmatic 
relationship with Iran. They argue that trade and investment do more to moderate Iran 
than do sanctions. According to Anthony Cordesman, "Most such states feel the U.S. is 
pursuing a policy that is mong history of tension and violence. While many scholars 
have offered their analysis of security and international politics, I borrow mainly from 
two such theorists - Robert Jervis and Zeev Maoz. I find their work particularly pertinent 
to my analysis of the U .S .-Iran relationship. 
Each chapter explores an element of my argument. Chapter II looks more closely 
at Iran's regional security environment, and seeks to place in perspective Iran's 
motivation for pursuing an arms buildup. It uses international relations theory as the 
theoretical framework, and argues that the hostile nature of the Middle East security 
environment poses a significant security dilemma for Iran to pursue a heightened security 
posture. 
Chapter III examines the Persian Gulf military balance in order to further place in 











the capabilities and spending patterns of neighbors such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Iran's 
conventional proliferation patterns are in fact modest, and cannot be perceived as 
destabilizing to the region. 
Chapter IV looks at the issue of Iranian sponsorship of terrorism. I argue that 
U.S. policy inaccurately places state-sponsored extremist organizations in the same 
category as other organizations, such as the apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo, which was 
responsible for the 1995 sarin gas attack in a Tokyo subway, by linking Iran's 
unconventional anns buildup to these organizations. For instance, in a 1999 testimony 
before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, State, the Judiciary and 
Related Agencies, former U.S. Secretary Madeleine K. Albright observed that, in the 
struggle against terrorism, "our adversaries [terrorist organizations] are likely to avoid 
traditional battlefield situations because there, American dominance is well established. 
They may resort, instead, to weapons of mass destruction .... "5 
This chapter compares Aum Shinrikyo with Hizballah, which is sponsored by 
Iran. I believe that state-sponsored groups, as an instrument of state policy, will 
necessarily have constraints not present for groups such as Aum. Chapter IV argues that 
Hizballah, distinct from Aum Shinrikyo, is also constrained by its ideology, goals, and 
the constituency to which it attempts to appeal, and from which it seeks new recruits. As 
the state sponsor, Iran is also constrained in its willingness and ability to provide such 
weapons to Hizballah. It is constrained by some of the same factors as the organization, 
4 Jahangir Amuzegar, "Adjusting to Sanctions," Foreign Affairs (May-June 1997): 33. 
5 U.S. Department of State, "Terrorism," Focus on the Issues: Building Peace and Security Around the 
World, February 2000 (Washington: Public Information Services, U.S. Department of State, 2000). 
hnp://www.stat.gov/www/focus_security.pdf 
7 
such as ideology and the constituency to which it would like to appeal; it is also 
constrained by the repercussions of such an attack upon its interests. This includes 
diminished deniability, physical and political damage to its neighbors, and the probability 
of retaliation from such pro-Western powerhouse states as Israel or Turkey, or even from 
the United States. 
Chapter V presents my conclusions, and examines whether there is indeed room 
for improved relations between the two very different states. Based on the facts I intend 
to present, I argue that there is, and that the time is now. 
8 
II. IRANIAN SECURITY 
A. THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
The perplexing reality of Iran is that the very threat that it poses to the rest of the 
Middle East - and to U.S. interests in the region - is Iran's complex geo-political 
environment, which is quite different from the United States'. While America enjoys a 
political stability and geographic isolation from any menace, this is not the case for Iran. 
The current relationship between the United States.and Iran is quite similar to that shared 
by Britain and Austria in the period after the Napoleonic Wars. Jervis summarizes. 
The differences between highly vulnerable and less vulnerable states are 
illustrated by the contrasting policies of Britain and Austria after the 
Napoleonic Wars. Britain's geographic isolation and political stability 
allowed her to take a fairly relaxed view of disturbances on the 
Continent ... Austria, surrounded by strong powers, was not so fortunate; 
her policy had to be more closely attuned to all conflicts ... So it is not 
surprising that Metternich propounded the doctrine ... which defended 
Austria's right to interfere in the internal affairs of others, and that British 
leaders rejected this view. 6 
In this chapter, I argue that, in a region replete with historic dispute and territorial 
conflict, Iran can just as easily be viewed as a country securing itself in a hostile 
environment as one that has caused the hostility. ?:eev Maoz provides an interesting 
analogy that I think exemplifies the Middle East security environment and its impact, not 
only on Iran's psychology, but that of the region, as well as the U.S.-Iran relationship. 
6 Ibid., 173. 
9 
Consider a residential neighborhood. The residents of the neighborhood are 
directly impacted by events in the neighborhood, as such events affect "their lives and 
their well-being."7 There are outsiders, such as those who live in other areas but who 
own businesses in the neighborhood, who have a stake in the neighborhood as well. 
States Maoz, "Security in any community is detennined by the extent to which members 
of the community feel safe, or by the extent to which outsiders feel safe when entering 
the neighbourhood."8 The level of safety in the neighborhood can be assessed by 
examining such issues as crime rate. High crime rates, or an increase in the crime rate for 
a given neighborhood will indicate security problems, and will impact both the residents 
and the outsiders who have a stake in the security of the neighborhood. Just as crime 
rates are an indication of the security level of our hypothetical neighborhood, rates of 
conflict serve as an indicator of the extent of security problems in a regional context, for 
a "region with numerous conflicts has more security problems than a region with few 
conflicts. "9 
This is a telling analogy for Iran. Consider its neighborhood, where international 
and regional intrigues have characterized the region throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. These intrigues in the "neighborhood" of the Middle East have 
impacted the region, and Iran in particular. They include, among others: 
• Soviet ~nvolvement in the secessionist governments of Kurdistan and 
Azerbaijan in northern Iran in 1946; 
7 Zeev Maoz, Regional Security in the Middle East: Past. Present, and Future (London: Frank Cass & 
Company, Ltd. 1997), 3. 
8 Ibid., 3. 
9 Ibid., 4. 
10 
• Prior to unification, civil war within South Yemen, as well as periodic 
warfare between North and South Yemen between 1972 and 1986. This 
conflict, which actually began with the British disengagement from the 
region beginning in the 1960s, engulfed the entire region, including Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, and became for Egypt what Vietnam was for the United 
States, costing Gamal abdul-Nasser millions of dollars and committing 
thousands of Egyptian troops; 
• Long-standing territorial conflict - dating back to 1939 - between the 
Persian Gulf states of Bahrain and Qatar over the Hawar islands and the 
Fasht Al-Dibel and Jarada rocks, which possess "potentially rich ... oil and 
gas deposits." This conflict nearly led to war between the two states in 
April 1986, and was resolved only after intervention by the International 
Court of Justice in 1991: 1 O Worth noting is Gulf Cooperation Council - of 
which both states are members - efforts to resolve the conflict failed 
repeatedly between 1986 and 1990; and 
• Continued hostilities and an arms race between India and Pakistan, both of 
whom possess nuclear capability. 
Maoz also states that a "shift in the locus of conflict from one region to the other 
indicates a shift in the security problems in various regions."! I He highlights, for 
example, studies that have found that such conflict has shifted from Europe and Latin 
America, where conflict characterized those regions prior to World War Il, to other 
regions, such as the Middle East, Asia, and Africa following the War. That is, "Europe, 
which was the more dangerous place to live in during the nineteenth.and first half of the 
twentieth century, became a relatively 'safe' region during the nµclear era."12 While the 
relative safety of Europe is debatable, Maoz offers some interesting observations for the 
reasons for such security. According to Maoz, regions may experience a relatively low · 
10 Arabia.com, "Bahrain and Qatar: The Territorial Conflict," Arabiacom, March 15, 2001. Online Article. 
http://www.arabia.com/article/O, 1690,New!# 1926,00.html, I. · 
11 Maoz,4. 
12 Ibid., 4. 
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level of violence because incentives for such violence have disappeared. More 
accurately, disincentives for such violence have been established by the states in the 
region. He elaborates: 
Rather, visible levels of violence in the region may have diminished 
because the members of the region may have employed was of deterring 
others from attacking them. These measures may be individual, such as 
changes in resource allocation for national [defense], bilateral or 
multilateral, such as alliance structures, or collective, such as the 
formation of a regional security organization that works above the main 
state.13 
Each of these aspects of regional security is important to Iran. Individual 
measures by states within the region have had a direct or an indirect impact on Iranian 
security. Iraq's development and subsequent employment of chemical weapons against 
Iran during the Iran-Iraq War had a direct impact on the country's security. Pakistan's 
and Israel's nuclear weapons capability, and with it their relationship with other states in 
the region have a significant impact on Middle East regional security. The impact of 
Israel's nuclear capability in the shadow of the Middle East Peace Process will be 
examined later. 
Bilateral, multilateral, and collective relationships from outside states may have 
also had a profound psychological impact on Iran. The Anglo-American operation that 
removed Prime Minister Muhammad Mussadiq from power in 1953 exacerbated an 
already festering suspicion of Western imperialism and greed, and left in its wake a 
bitterness that exists to this day. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981 as, among other 
things, a security cooperative among its member states. It includes only Arab Gulf states, 
12 
meaning it excludes Iran (and, ironically, Iraq). From a security standpoint, the 
effectiveness of the GCC is arguable, but its implications cannot be ignored. Politically 
such an arrangement isolates Iran, a key member in the Gulf, and offers questions as to its 
intentions. 
While there has been no military conflict between Iran and the GCC, the 
ramifications are quite comparable to those of Russia and the NATO security 
arrangements, which the former Soviet Union still finds threatening a decade after the 
end of the Cold War. This, as well as the frosty relationship between Washington and 
Tehran, has provided Iran ample incentive to seek security relationships elsewhere, 
including with Russia and China, traditional rivals of the United States. In other words, 
unlike Europe, the disincentives for violence (or rather, for potential violence in Iran's 
case) have not taken shape in the Middle East. Iran, like any other state, has chosen to 
seek security where it can find it-in the arms of our "enemies." 
B. THE SECURITY DILEMMA AND IRAN 
Iran's desire for arms - both conventional and unconventional -is not new. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, under Mohammed Reza Shah, Iran engaged in a substantial military 
buildup motivated by his need for internal and external security. His main sponsor - the 
United States. Rouhallah K. Ramazani suggests that the Shah perceived that the greatest 
threat to Iranian security was from the outside. States Ramazani, "His basic assumption 
must be extracted from his perception of Iranian experience in international politics. In 
the last analysis, the Shah ... viewed Anglo-Russian imperial rivalries as the most 
13 Ibid., 5. 
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fundamental problem of Iranian foreign policy."14 In fact, the Shah was so occupied with 
security concerns that he made it his top priority. He linked all other aspects of Iran's 
welfare to security. Thus, "The attainment of social, economic and political development 
as well as true independence, all hinged, in the last analysis, on the achievement of 
security."15 Between 1950 and 1978, the Shah received almost $1 billion is military aid 
and thousands of military advisors from the United States. The most assistance came in 
1958, when Iran received $104.9 million in military aid from the U.S.16 
The global political environment has changed quite significantly since then. The 
conservative mullas (religious clerics) seized power, overthrowing the Shah in 1979. The 
Soviet Union collapsed, ending the Cold War. The United States stands alone as the 
single superpower. Some things did not change, however. With the Iranian Revolution 
came new ambitions, including the export of the Revolution throughout the Middle East, 
and sponsorship of extremist cells in the Gulf, in the Levant, and in Africa. With it also 
came perceptions of new threats, from among its neighbors and from the West. This new 
insecurity led Iran into its fruitless eight-year war with Iraq from 1980-1988. 
International relations theory provides some insight into Iran's history of 
insecurity. Iran typifies the state engulfed in Robert Jervis' "security dilemma." Security 
dilemma theory suggests that states will attempt to increase its security at the expense of 
its neighbors. These could take the form of arms buildups, territorial expansion, or, if 
14 Rouhallah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
1975), 256. 
15 Ibid., 259. 
16 Amounts computed by author from Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Table 6," U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: 
Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 199 J ). 112. 
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states are linked "between domestic and foreign policy ... the quest for security may drive 
states to interfere pre-emptively in the domestic politics of others in order to provide an 
ideological buffer zone." 17 Iran has used various methods that support Jervis' theory: 
• It has purchased arms, despite sanctions, from Russia, China, and North Korea, 
among others; 
• It has a territorial dispute - going back to the nineteenth century - with the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) over the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa, three 
islands located in the southern Persian Gulf north.of Dubai; and 
• It has undermined the Middle East peace process by sponsoring terrorist 
organizations in southern Lebanon (Hizballah) and the West Bank (Hamas), and 
has come under criticism from Bahrain for allegedly fomenting Shi'ite unrest in 
the Southern Gulf country as a result of its unsatisfied claim on Bahrain.18 
Security dilemma theory suggests that a state will make subjective security 
demands based on its perceptions of its vulnerability in relation to its neighbors. States 
Jervis, "A state that is predisposed to see either a specific other state as an adversary, or 
others in general as a menace, will react more strongly than a state that sees its 
environment as benign."19 Iran fits this description. It shares borders with historic rivals 
and unstable governments, including Iraq, the former Soviet Union, Persian Gulf States, 
and the hotbed of Central Asia. Iraq employed chemical weapons on Iranian citizens and 
soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War. It is speculated that Iraq retains a substantial inventory 
of these weapons, in spite of UN sanctions against that country. As aforementioned, Iran 
has had historic territorial disputes with its Persian Gulf neighbors, many of whom enjoy 
I 7 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): J 68, 
169. 
18 Cordesman and Hashim, 137. 
19 Jervis, 175. 
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an economic and military relationship with the United States. It shares a border with 
Pakistan, a country with an ongoing nuclear race with India. In short, Iran's environment 
is far from benign. Under these circumstances, one must question whether Iran is as 
much a threat to stability to the region as the United States perceives it to be. 
It is, in fact, our perceptions of one another that have driven our respective 
postures toward one another, for better or for worse. In fact, according to some 
contemporary international relations theorists, so-called "psychological dynamics" can 
have a significant influence on decision makers: That is, as Jervis puts it, "people 
perceive what they expect to be present."20 Decision-makers will assume that the arms of 
others indicate aggressive intentions, especially as they develop a hostile image of the 
other, despite "ambiguous and even discrepant information."21 In the case of Iran and the 
United States, much of this is driven by history. 
As alluded to earlier, Iran has developed a perception of the United States as 
intrusive and imperialistic. Following World War II, the United States appeared to side 
with Great Britain in its desires to retain control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(AOIC), an enterprise that exerted significant control over the government of Iran. 
Washington also consorted with London in Operation Ajax, the operation that removed 
the nationalistic Prime Minister Muhammad Mussadiq from power and replaced him with 
the pro-Western Shah. America also aided Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War. 
20 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976), 68. 
21 Ibid., 68. 
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From the U.S. perspective, the revolution that removed the Shah, the seizure of 
the U.S. embassy in Tehran twice in 1979, and the subsequent hostage crisis that helped 
remove a president was incentive enough to enact strict sanctions against Iran, to freeze 
millions in Iranian assets in the United States, and to paint Iran as a nation of fanatics. It 
has been over twenty years, a "moderate" parliament has come of its own in Iran, and our 
ally in the Iran-Iraq War has become the biggest threat to the region. With new 
presidential administrations since the Iran-Iraq War came new polices, but what has not 
changed since the 1979 embassy takeover in Tehran, is U.S. perceptions of Iran as 
fanatical and threatening to U.S. interests in the region. 
As evidenced by our current policy, these perceptions persist, however. As Jervis 
states, decision makers "frequently assume ... that the arms of others indicate aggressive 
intentions. So an increase in the other's military forces makes the state doubly insecure -
first, because the other has an increased capability to do harm, and, second, because this 
behavior is taken to show that the other is not only a potential threat but is actively 
contemplating hostile actions."22 This appears to be exactly America's perception of 
Iran. 
Exacerbating the dilemma is the opposing state's perception of itself. The arming 
state perceives of its policy as merely defensive in nature. It further perceives that other 
states know this. In other words, while the United States - and some of its partners in the 
region - may perceive of any Iranian buildup as aggressive, Iran does not perceive of 
itself in this way. Naturally, this leads to a further cooling of relations, as resentment at 
22 Ibid., 68. 
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such perceptions by Iran sets in. Consider the following observation by Lord Grey, the 
British foreign secretary before World War I: 
The distinction between preparations made with the intention of going to 
war and precautions against attack is a true distinction, clear and definite 
in the minds of those who build up armaments. But it is a distinction that 
is not obvious or certain to others ... Each Government, therefore, while 
resenting any suggestions that its own measures are anything more than 
for defense, regards similar measures of another Government as 
preparation for attack.23 
This observation can be equally applied to diplomatic relations between the U.S. 
and Iran, as these conflicting conceptions of one another have maintained the tension 
between the two governments for almost fifty years. Consider, again, the example of the 
Mussadiq Affair of 1953. Prior to the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mussadiq, the 
United States enjoyed a very positive reputation among Iranians, and was in fact invited 
into Iran as a third party balance against what they perceived was an intrusive and 
imperialistic Britain. Following the coup, however, Iran viewed America as "imperial, 
arrogant, and contemptuous."24 The coup, from the Iranian perspective, was a 
malevolent act, and in the eyes of Mussadiq's constituency, the Prime Minister held a 
"mandate from the people and, as such, his removal from power was illegal and 
criminal. "25 
The British and American view was quite different, however. They viewed the 
coup as a benevolent gesture of rationality and caution. Major American media viewed 
23 Ibid., 69. 
24 David Lesch, The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment (Boulder: 
Westview Press, Inc., 1996), 67. 
25 Ibid., 73. 
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Mussadiq as fanatical and unreasonable. In other words, the West viewed its intervention 
in Iran as necessary for the good of Iran. These contrasting perceptions persist to this 
day. While America views its posture in the region as necessary to ensure the security 
and stability of the region against a hegemonic threat, Iran views it as imperial, unfair, 
and intrusive. 
These are the conditions under which we must consider Iran. As I have shown, 
many of Iran's claims in the region are not new, and therefore cannot be viewed as 
products of a radical or destabilizing regime. It serves as a fitting example of a state 
immersed in the security dilemma. The Islamic Revolution did little to ameliorate the 
insecurity characteristic of pre-revolutionary Iran. 
Given the regional security environment, the perception_ of Iran as the catalyst for 
destabilizing the region, in the post-Khomeini era, is simplistic, and doesn't consider the 
"neighborhood" in which it is located. In the fifty years since the end of World War II, 
America has had to remain heavily involved in Iran, for better or for worse. Our 
relationship with Iran reached a dramatic turning point with the 1953 Mussadiq Affair, 
and set the impetus for the frosty relationship that culminated with the overthrow of the 
Shah. The Islamic Revolution only fomented the insecurity characteristic of pre-
revolutionary Iran, as evidenced by its policies, including the embassy takeovers, the 
hostage crisis, its war with Iraq, and its support of international terrorism. The next 
section examines Iran's contemporary security concerns, in terms of its conventional and 
unconventional weapons capability relative to the rest of the Gulf, as well as its economic 
capability to procure weapons. 
19 
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Ill. IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION - CONSTRAINTS ON IRAN'S PROLIFERATION 
CAPACITY 
In order to understand the real threat of Iran's proliferation capability, 
conventionally and unconventionally, we should examine her economic capacity to 
support it. Every state in the region must wrestle with the domestic implications of any 
policy decision it makes. Iran, as well as its Arab neighbors, is straight jacketed by the 
social pact it has with its citizens - the government provides jobs, services, and capital 
for private investment, in exchange for the people's acquiescence in government matters. 
In Iran specifically, the rhetoric of social justice under Quranic principles has placed 
great pressure on the revolutionary government to produce real results in the 
socioeconomic sphere. Thus, any pursuit of proliferation necessarily undermines the 
political bases of the Iranian regime. 
In this chapter, I argue that the revolutionary regime's record has not been good. 
"Revolution, war, economic mismanagement, population growth, and . political 
instability" has caused significant economic problems for the Islamic Republic.26 Central 
to its economic woes is its dependence on oil, a highly volatile market. The post-
revolutionary period coincided with a massive rise in oil prices, and as such, the 
revolutionary regime engaged in excesses, centralizing virtually every aspect of the 
economy, confiscating royal land, and building a massive government sector epitomized 
by revolutionary foundations or bonyads. According to Bijan Khajehpour, these 
26 Cordesman and Hashim, 29. 
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foundations have exercised control of the major sectors of the economy, even to this day. 
He elaborates: 
It is estimated that these foundations own some twenty percent of the asset 
base of the Iranian economy with a ten percent contribution to the 
country's GDP. Furthermore over the past decade, a large number of 
state-owned entities engaged in the establishment of semi-public and 
semi-private firms, which have taken over some of the privatized 
companies. Hence, if one includes all the mentioned semi-public 
entities, it is estimated that the public sector controls some eighty 
percent of the Iranian economy.27 
In fact, the post-revolutionary Iranian economy has been characterized by 
economic distortions, including widespread price controls, trade and exchange 
restrictions, a heavily subsidized energy sector, multiple exchange rates, and tightly 
controlled labor and business practices.28 Added to this is an unemployment rate that 
has remained above fifteen percent since the end of the Iran-Jfaq War, and an inflation 
rate in the thirty to thirty-five percent range. This has placed great pressure on a 
revolutionary regime facing "a rapidly growing, young . population with limited job 
prospects; heavy dependence on oil revenues (about half the state's budget and eighty 
percent of the country's hard currency earnings); $12 billion in external debt.. .expensive 
state subsidies on many basic goods; a large, inefficient public sector and state 
monopolies ( ... answerable only to supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei); a serious 
drought; and international isolation and sanctions."29 
27 Bijan Khajehpour, "Domestic Reforms and Private Sector Activity in Iran," FindArticles.com. Online 
article. 2000. http://www.findarticles.com/cf_O/m2267!2_67/63787344/print.jhtml 
28 International Monetary Fund, Staff Country Report No. 00/120: Islamic Republic of Iran: Recent 
Economic Developments. Online report. 2000. http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/scr/2000/crOOl 20.pdf 
29 "Iran Energy Oil Information," United States Energy Information Administration. Online report. 
September 2000. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html. 
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These concerns have forced Iran to turn inward, and to focus on the social 
pressures these economic realities pose. The government has attempted to decrease 
subsidies, including those on petroleum, where prices have risen by seventy percent (even 
though its share of the country's GDP has risen from seven percent in 1998-1999 to 
seventeen percent in 1999-2000). It has also privatized dozens of publicly owned 
enterprises in an effort to increase the role of the private sector. Worth noting also is the 
recent debate regarding foreign investment, which is seen as vital to the rejuvenation of 
Iran's struggling and inefficient economy. International oil companies - inside and 
outside the Gulf - have expressed a desire for Tehran to offer "more enticing investment 
tenns ... to a country hungry for cash and Western technology for its ageing oilfields."30 
Needless to say, this has domestic and international implications. The mere 
discussion highlights the division between the "refonnist" element in Iran (epitomized by 
Khatami) and the "radical" element (embodied by Khamenei), whose interests are 
threatened by any economic reform. From an international standpoint, this debate may 
signal Iran's recognition that a cozier relationship with its neighbors, as well as the West, 
is essential to the economic well-being of the country. 
B. IRAN'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY 
Now that we have established the baseline for Iran's procurement capacity, we 
can now tum our attention to what any of this has to do with security in the Gulf. It is 
thus worthwhile to examine trends in Iran's conventional weapons procurement in the 
1990s, for this is the primary means by which it has threate~ed its neighbors in the Gulf. 
30 Michael Georgy, "Iran Under Pressure to Set Terms for Global Oil Finns," Expresslndia.com. Online 
anicle. July 10, 1999. http://www.expressindia.com 
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Trends in the 1990s indicate that Iran has not placed a great emphasis on a massive 
conventional arms buildup. In fact, "Iran's military effort is only a small fraction of the 
share of GNP that Iran spent during the Iran-Iraq War, and Iran's increasing GDP is 
steadily reducing the impact of its military effort on its economy."31 When placed in 
context with other countries in the Gulf, Iran's military expenditures appear quite 
moderate. Table One shows that Iran's spending trends between 1995 and 1999 were 
comparable to its neighbors' in the Gulf, and indeed paled in comparison to Saudi 
Arabia's. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
Iran 2500 3400 4700 5800 
Iraq 1300 1300 1300 1300 
Saudi Arabia 17,2000 17,400 18,200 20,900 
Kuwait 3500 3600 3600 3400 
UAE 2000 2100 3100 3700 
Table I: Gulf Military Expenditures 1995-1999 ($Current U.S. Millions).32 
This time period is significant in terms of the effectiveness of sanctions. First, in 
spite of sanctions, including ILSA, military expenditures by Iran - and the rest of the 
Gulf for that matter - increased. This is attributable to rising oil prices throughout the 
period, especially by 1999, providing each of these states the ability to spend more on 
their militaries. Second, it is noteworthy that Saudi Arabia has spent four to five times 
more on its military than has Iran, much of it on weapons from the United States, in spite 
of a substantial U.S. military presence in the Gulf since the Gulf War. 
31 Anthony Cordesrnan, "The Conventional Military Balance in the Gulf in 2000." Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, January 2000 (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2000), 68. 








Comparisons of other key military indicators are also revealing. Inventories of 
such key military components as advanced combat aircraft, infantry fighting vessels, and 
main battle tanks indicate that Iran is significantly outpaced by its neighbors Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia. Analysis of total arms deals demonstrates that, while arms purchases 
among key regional purchasers have fallen across the board, arms buys by Saudi Arabia 
have outpaced Irans by a factor of five between 1987 and 1990, by almost twenty 
between 1991 and 1994, and by over five times between 1995 and 1998.33 The 
appendices to this text provide further elaboration on recent trends in conventional anns 
proliferation in the Gulf. 
Iran's most significant advantage lies in its enormous population, which is 
approximately seventy million people, almost four times that of Saudi Arabia, and 
roughly three times that of Iraq. This provides Iran with a substantial pool from which to 
recruit and mobilize forces. As Appendix C shows, however, equipment shortages pose a 
dilemma for Iran's military. Among its components, Iran retains weapons that are 
archaic or obsolete. For their part, sanctions have limited Iran's ability to obtain 
sophisticated weapons and parts. Iran does boast an ability to manufacture some military 
weaponry, however, which suggests that economic and political factors, as outlined 
earlier, have restricted Tehran's arms buildup. 
33 Ibid., 18 
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Other issues stand out as well. The issue for some Southern Gulf states is not 
whether Iran desires to assert hegemony in the region. In fact, many of these states fear 
each other more than they fear Iran. Cordesman makes the following observations about 
the Southern Gulf countries: 
• The GCC is "a myth in war fighting and force development 
. terrns."34 There is no focus on common missions, and current arms 
inventories preclude standardization; 
• Southern Gulf states cooperate more closely with the U.S. than 
with each other; 
• Southern Gulf states are divided as to what they perceive as their 
primary threat. The lower Gulf states focus on Iran, while Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia focus on Iraq. The GCC's rapid deployment 
force is ineffectual, and cooperation between Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia is poor; and 
• All Southern Gulf states fear their neighbors: 
~ Bahrain versus Qatar 
~ Fear of Saudi dominance (especially Qatar and Oman) 
~ UAE internal divisions and fear of Oman 
~ Kuwaiti concerns with Saudi Arabia over border issues 
~ Saudi views Yemen as serious a threat as lraq.35 
Therefore, Iran is not the only source of a regional arms race. 
The issue here is not whether Iran's behavior should be ignored. Indeed, the 
United States should be quite concerned over any arms buildup in the Middle East. What 
is not clear, based on this evidence, is whether Iran's behavior should be perceived as 
inherently violent, offensive, or hegemonic, given the fact that many of the Gulf states 
fear one another more than they fear Iran. This leads them to engage in arms races to 
balance against each other, not only against Iran. 
34 Ibid., 84. 
26 
C. IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: TRENDS TOWARDS MODERATION 
Iran has in recent years demonstrated a willingness to open up to its neighbors in 
the region, especially Saudi Arabia, which suggests that Tehran is leaning toward a more 
pragmatic regional policy. President Khatami made an historic visit to Saudi Arabia in 
1999, signaling an end to a decade of mistrust and hostility stemming from the 1987 clash 
between Iranian demonstrators and Saudi security forces at the Grand Mosque in 
Mecca.36 Nearly four hundred Iranians were killed, severing relations between the two 
countries. Since Khatami's visit, the two countries have cooperated closely, engaging in 
economic talks, and working to manage oil prices for the good of both nations. In a 1998 
interview with Abdul Rahman Al Rashed, Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Aswat newspaper 
out of London, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah expressed support for Iran's arms 
proliferation: 
Asked whether Iran's growing armament and military maneuvers posed 
any threat to the region, Prince Abdullah said: 'Iran has every right to 
develop its defensive capabilities for its security without harming 
others ... We also do the same. All countries follow the same policy, then 
why only Iran is singled out here without mentioning others? Why don't 
you ask the Israeli armament and its unlimited weapons development 
programs?'37 
When asked at that time whether Saudi Arabia had engaged in any secret military or 
security arrangements with Iran, the Crown Prince responded, "We don't need such 
35 Ibid., 84. 
36 BBC News, "Iran and Saudi Arabia Strengthen Ties," BBC News Online Network., May 17, 1999. 
Online Anicle. http://news.bbc.eo.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_345000/345834.stm, I. 
37 Arab View, "Interview with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia," interview by Abdul Rahman Al 
Rashed, ArabNet. Online article. 1998. http://www.arab.net/arabview/anicles/rashed33.html, 2. 
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secret agreements as we tell things openly ... and we don't fear anybody except Allah."38 
It may be due to U.S. presence and arms assistance, but this does not reflect the tone of a 
leader fearful of Iran. 
Recent arms agreements appear to reflect a dependence on arms from Russia. In 
reality, however, imports from Russia have dropped to only a quarter of what they were 
just prior to the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Arms sales agreements with Russia dropped to 
only $200 million in 1992-1995, compared with $2.5 billion during 1987-1990.39 Iran's 
relationship with Russia has not gone unnoticed by the United States, however. 
Washington has called for Moscow to discontinue its agreements with Iran. This has 
served only to highlight the loopholes endemic in ILSA.40 
These Russian-Iranian arms agreements should be taken in context, however. 
Russian arms sales to Iran diminished significantly after the Iran-Iraq War. Iran has 
procured weapons from China, Eastern Europe, and North Korea. Most of these are of 
low grade or near-obsolescence. Iran has shifted from dependence on the West during 
the Shah, to dependence on Asia (including North Korea and China), to dependence on 
Russia, creating problems in conversion, spare parts, and standardization of equipment. 
Iran's relationship with Russia thus has disadvantages as well as well as advantages. 
38 Ibid., 2. 
39 Cordesrnan, "The Conventional Military Balance in the Gulf in 2000." 68. 
40 John Broder, "Despite a Secret Pact by Gore in '95, Russian Arms Sales to Iran Go On," The New York 
Times, 13 October 2000, sec A, p.1. 
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· D. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
In its most recent analysis of proliferation trends in the Middle East, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense outlines several U.S. goals for the region, including a 
comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab world, security arrangements that 
"assure the stability of the Gulf region and unimpeded commercial access to its 
petroleum reserves," and combating terrorism.41 In the report, the Secretary lists Iran 
among those states whose pursuit of nuclear, chemical, and biological technology 
threatens the stability of the region and undermines America's goals in the Middle East. 
Table Two outlines the Defense Department's concerns. 
41 Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response," DefenseLINK. Online 
publication. January 2001. www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf 
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Russia is completing construction of power reactor at Bushehr and 
recently agreed to additional nuclear cooperation; China has pledged 
not to sell a key facility and other nuclear technologies. 
Acceded to the NPT and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). 
Biological Possesses overall infrastructure and expertise to support biological 
warfare program. 
Pursues contacts with Russian entities and other sources to acquire 
dual-use equipment and technology. 
Believed to be actively pursuing offensive biological warfare 
capabilities; may have small qua,ntities of usable agent now. 
Ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). 
Chemical Began chemical warfare program during Iran-Iraq war; employed 
limited amounts of agent against Iraqi troops. 
Ballistic 
Missiles 
Possesses weaponized stockpile of agents; capable of agent delivery; 
trains military forces to operate in contaminated environment. 
Seeking to improve chemical precursor production capability. 
Ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
Has force of SCUD B, SCUD C, and Chinese CSS-8 SRBMs; 
producing SCUDs. 
Main effort is to produce Shahab-3 MRBM, based on North-Korean 
No Dong; effort involves considerable Russian and Chinese assistance. 
Flight-tested Shahab-3 in July 1998, and in July and September 2000. 
Seeking to develop additional longer-range missiles, such as MRBMs, 
IRBMs, and possibly an ICBM. 
Other Means of Land-, sea-, and air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles; air launched 
Delivery tactical missiles; none have NBC warheads. 
Capability 
Aircraft: fighters. 
Ground systems: artillery, rocket launchers. 
Table 2: Iran's NBC Weapons and Missile Prograrns42 
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Other reports regarding Iran's NBC capability appear less than conclusive, 
however. In a 1998 report for the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Andrew Koch and 
Jeanette Wolf acknowledge that the only evidence of a viable nuclear facility in Iran is 
the one at Bushehr. Even this facility appears adequate for only civil purposes. Financed 
by Russia in 1995 for an astonishing $800 million, the facility (which was badly damaged 
during the Iran-Iraq War) has "already cost Iran billions of dollars."43 
The problem for Iran remains its ability to pay for the facility, its ability to run the 
facility, and its ability to obtain the materials. As it is, Iran has historically had problems 
obtaining even Russian assistance in getting this program off the ground. Iran and Russia 
actually signed their first protocol on the project in 1990, according to Koch and Wolf, 
but it was delayed by technical and financial problems. They_ tried again in 1993, with 
the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and Iran's AEOI signing a contract 
for the construction of two reactors at Bushehr. State Koch and Wolf, "That contract was 
never entered into force because Iran asked for a postponement of the fixed time limits 
due to financing problems."44 While the construction of any nuclear facility in Iran 
would provide Iranian scientists opportunity to glean the expertise necessary to develop 
nuclear weapons, even this would take some time. Iran has suffered from financing 
problems, and has been unable to procure dual-use materials (even Russia halted 
42 Ibid., 35 
43 Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, "Iran's Nuclear Facilities: A Profile," Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies. Online repon. l 998. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/iran.h1m, J. 
44Ibid., 2. 
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provision of a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant and a large research reactor, and 
has vowed not to supply Iran with hardware capable of delivering WMD).45 
Consider also the feasibility of such a WMD attack from Iran in the context of the 
Middle East Peace Process. One of the tenets of revolutionary Islam is the destruction of 
the state of Israel. At face value, this is certainly reason enough to prevent proliferation 
of NBC weapons by Tehran. ·Regional political considerations force us to look more 
closely, however. Consider the demographics and geography of the Levant. Just over 
one million Arabs populate Israel, making a nuclear attack on Israel an attack on Arabs.46 
Geography poses the same dilemma. The Jordanian, Syrian, and Lebanese 
capitals of Amman, Damascus, and Beirut, respectively, are in potential fallout ranges of 
a serious WMD attack against Jerusalem (43.6 miles, 134 miles, and 146 miles 
respectively). In this scenario, the attack would then force Arab states into the fray. It 
could also give leverage, both regionally and internationally to Iran's real threat -
Baghdad. 
These are scenarios, but they are ones that are grounded in reality, and supported 
by history. During the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam was able to capitalize on Arab versus 
Persian enmity following Iran's attacks of Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf. He also 
capitalized on U.S. support as a result of U.S. disdain for Iran, given its terrorist acts 
against the U.S. Such an attack could cause history to repeat itself, at least from the Arab 
45 CNN, "Official: Russia will not Supply Mass Destruction Weapons to Iran." CNN.com, November 23, 
2000. Online article. http://europe.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/l l/23/russia.iran.ap/, 1. 
46 The Arab Association for Human Rights, 'The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel," HRA.org. Online 
report. 2000. http://www.arabhra.org/article26/general.htm. 
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regional context, undermining Iran's efforts to open diplomatic ties with the region and 
with the West. In Arab eyes, only Saddam would be able to counter the Persian threat. 
However, the region does not publicly demonstrate fear of Iran's activities. Our 
closest partner in the region, Saudi Arabia, does not fear Iran. Russia has vowed not to 
supply hardware capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to Iran. Iran's 
conventional inventory is mediocre at best. It continues to be a country of valuable geo-
strategic interest. Iraq remains the biggest hegemonic threat to the region, and even our 
policy there is unpopular in the region. Now appears to be the time to act diplomatically 
and decisively in Iran. 
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IV. IRAN AND TERRORISM 
In a feat that shocked the world, on March 20, 1995 the Japanese apocalyptic cult 
Aum Shinrikyo carried out a chemical attack in the Tokyo subway system with the nerve 
gas sarin. Twelve people were killed and upwards of three thousand were injured.47 
With this came a new attention to the threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass 
destruction. It has also justified sanctions against such "-rogue" nations as Iran, who have 
historically sponsored extremist organizations worldwide, and whose weapons 
proliferation programs have been linked to this sponsorship. 
This chapter examines the accuracy of such a linkage. Preventing the acquisition 
of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons to extremist groups is certainly important. It 
is, however, simplistic to arbitrarily lump all extremist organizations together, as such a 
linkage tends to do. I propose that state-sponsored terrorist organizations must be 
distinguished from their apocalyptic counterparts (Aum Shinrikyo ), or even from 
"freelancers" with whom they may share more in common (such as Osama bin Laden's 
al-Qa'ida). State-sponsored terrorist groups, in my opinion, are necessarily bound by 
certain constraints that are not present for other types of organizations. These constraints 
are levied by internal factors such as the ideology and goals of the organization, which 
are more limited than those of an apocalyptic group, and by external factors such as the 
constituency to which the organization seeks to appeal and to draw its membership. As 
an instrument of a state's policy, such organizations are also limited by politics 
emanating from the state benefactor, which is itself constrained by considerations such as 
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diminished deniability, relationships with other states, and the prospects for retaliation by 
the victimized state or its allies. There are no such constraints on apocalyptic or freelance 
organizations, so they enjoy a freedom of activity not possible for state-sponsored groups. 
By making this distinction, I seek to examine the current threat of such an attack 
from Hizballah, Iran's most notorious beneficiary, based on the group's organization, 
political relationships, ideology, and history of operations. When compared to those of 
Aum Shinrikyo, we see that there are certain internal and external limiting factors that 
constrain the organization's willingness and ability to acquire such technology, and as 
such, pose a WMD threat to U.S. interests. My argument is made mainly in the context 
of the Middle East political environment, as this has been the primary focus of my thesis. 
I focus on the chemical and biological threat, because that is the most likely WMD 
method currently available; as I have shown, Iran's nuclear capability is in its 
developmental stages and is rudimentary at best. 
I first examine the organizational and ideological constraints upon Hizballah, as 
compared to the freedom of activity offered by the same elements of the Aum Shinrikyo 
cult. It is necessary to show that group ideology and makeup will go far to limit the 
lengths to which the organization will go in order to further its cause. Next, I compare 
the groups' access to chemical weapons and their operational effectiveness, in the context 
of group objectives. I look at chemical weapons because in both cases this seems to be 
the weapon of choice based on availability. I will demonstrate that, in Hizballah's case, 
political ramifications of a chemical attack for the organization and for its benefactor, 
47 David E. Kaplan. "Aum Shinrikyo (1995)" in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and 
Biological Weapons ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge: MIT Press. 2000), 219. 
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Iran, will also limit the appeal of such an act. I offer that such a comparison provides a 
much more realistic assessment of the actual nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons 
threat that Iran-sponsored extremist organizations pose to U.S. interests in the region. 
A. illZBALLAH VERSUS AUM SIDNRIKYO 
1. Organization and Ideology 
It is worthwhile to look more closely at the three 'types of extremist organizations 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. I place particular interest on the word 
"types" because that is what they are, distinct types of terrorist organizations, with 
distinct motivations, access to unconventional weapons, and freedom of movement. 
State-sponsored organizations such as Hizballah act as an instrUment of the state's 
foreign or domestic policies. They could be used to suppress opposition at home, or the 
the case of Hizballah, act as an oppositional force to the state's enemies abroad. The 
state provides funding, training, and weapons to the group in pursuit of its policy. The 
organization in tum acts upon the direction of the state sponsor. This relationship, I 
argue, places constraints on the organization's activities, based on the will of the sponsor, 
which in tum must respond to the political environment abroad. 
Independent organizations, including apocalyptic groups such as Aum, don't 
enjoy such state resources, but they are not constrained by the whims of the state sponsor, 
either. This gives them a freedom of action not enjoyed by the state-sponsored 
organization. In the case of Aum Shinrikyo, their religious ideology allows them to 
commit unthinkable acts of violence, as it is not a means to an end, but the end itself. I 
thus compare the Lebanese Hizballah and Aum Shinrikyo, in order to shed light on the 
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. real threat of a chemical, biological, or nuclear threat from the Iran-sponsored group. I 
look first at structural and ideological differences between the two. 
Hizballah is among the most notorious of the groups sponsored by Iran, and has 
received training, funding, and direct orders from elements inside Iran since its founding 
in 1982. It was established as a resistance to the Israeli invasion and occupation of 
southern Lebanon in 1982, and has served as the spearhead for Tehran's fight against 
Israel, and has launched a variety of paramilitary and terrorist attacks into Israel from its 
base in Lebanon. According to the Israel-based International Policy Institute for 
Counter-terrorism (JCT), Hizballah has received a variety of weapons from Iran, 
including mortars, Sagger anti-tank rockets, mines, explosives, and small arms. The 
largest came in February-March 1992, following clashes between Israel and the 
Hizballah.48 Training comes mainly in the form of advice and supervision, as basic 
instruction is conducted by the organization itself. According to ICT, higher level 
training is conducted by the Guardians of the Revolution in Iran at the al-Quds Force 
training base in northern Tehran. 
The Office of International Criminal Justice has placed funding at $50 million to 
$600 million a year, including a monthly stipend of $150 to $200 a month to Hizballah 
militiarnen.49 It also receives funding from the Palestinian Diaspora worldwide, 
48 International Policy Institute for Counter·terrorism. "Iranian Terrorism." ICT.org, 2000. Online report. 
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/st_terror/iran.htm. 
49 Jeffrey A. Builta, Extremist Groups: An International Compilation of Terrorist Organizations, Violent 
Political Groups, and Issue-Oriented Militant Movements (Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1996), 
691. 
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including those inside the United States. Its operations are directed primarily by Syria, its 
other sponsor. This was in fact codified with the signing of the 1989 Ta' if Agreement, 
which effectively ended Lebanon's civil war. In it, Hizballah was forced to conform to 
Syrian dictate, and has since received its orders directly from Damascus, particularly 
during the reign of Syrian President Hafez al-Asad. 
Hizballah was established in the context of Palestinian nationalist resistance to 
Israeli expansionist activity, including its occupation of southern Lebanon; it has 
continued to resist any negotiations with Israel in the context of the process; and it is 
committed to the destruction of Israel, withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Middle East, 
and the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine, along the lines of Iran. It is this 
nationalist ideology that forms the basis for Hizballah's structure. While it does in fact 
have a "loose confederation of militant groups" that forms the operational arm of the 
group, Hizballah is, in fact, a political party. Its structure mimics that of the political 
structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It has a seventeen-man consultative Supreme 
Shura (counsel), which "decides on administrative, legislative, executive, judicial, 
political, and military matters."50 Its Executive Committee is formed from the four area 
councils of Beirut, Southern Suburbs, Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon, and is 
headed by a Secretary-General. Regional Shuras run daily activities of each district, and 
the fifteen-member Politburo supervises the committees and departments created within 
the party "as the need ~ses." It publishes numerous newspapers and periodicals within 
Lebanon and across the Middle East, and operates a radio station inside Lebanon itself. It 
50 Ibid., 688. 
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has provided social services to the population of southern Lebanon, including schools, 
clinics, and mosques. 
Context is important in our discussion of terrorist organizations. Such political 
inclinations constrain its ability to conduct "total war," as most people are extremely 
averse to such methods as chemical or biological terrorism. Hizballah is also distinct 
from Aum, in that it does not enjoy the freedom of activity of the latter. As Kaplan 
observes, a "contributing factor to Aum's behavior was the degree of impunity the cult 
enjoyed. Despite an extraordinary six-year crime spree, the sect met with surprisingly 
little resistance from Japanese officials, who were hampered by jurisdictional problems, a 
reluctance to probe religious organizations, and a lack of investigative initiative."51 This 
is not the case with Hizballah. Military clashes with Lebanese militia forces during the 
civil war in Lebanon, and subsequent confrontations with the Israeli Defense Forces and 
the South Lebanese Army, as well as political antagonism with Yasser Arafat's PLO, 
have constrained the organization's activities. This, coupled with the political constraints 
of answering to government authority, especially Syria, places the group at the whims of 
its sponsor. 
This clearly political character of Hizballah distinguishes it, and its motivations, 
from those of "religious extremists" such as Aum Shinrikyo. As stated earlier, Hizballah 
clearly desires the establishment of an Islamic state reflective of Iran. But it is this 
politicization of religion that distinguishes it from the Japanese group. The Encyclopedia 
of World Terrorism characterizes Hizballah as a religious extremist organization similar 
to Aum Shinrikyo. It argues that many contemporary extremist organizations have a 
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religious background (such as the Catholic-dominated Provisional IRA or the Protestant 
paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland), but it is "the nationalist or separatist aspects of 
these groups that predominate. "52 It distinguishes the motives of religious organizations 
as theologically-based, and has a "god-driven aspect" not present with secular groups: 
Secular groups attempt to appeal to sympathizers, members of the 
communities that they claim to defend, or the aggrieved people they say 
they speak for. But some religious terrorists are engaged in what they 
regard as a "total war." This sanctions almost limitless depths of 
violence, and anyone who is not a member of the terrorists' religion 
may be seen as a legitimate target ... Religious terrorists usually want the 
greatest benefits for members of their faith only ... Secular terrorists see 
violence primarily as a means to an end. But religious extremists, 
because of the divine element of their motivation, often view violence 
as and end in itself. 53 
This definition is problematic, in that it incorrectly over-generalizes the role of 
religion for groups such as Hizballah. While this definition may adequately describe 
apocalyptic groups such as Awn, it does little to characterize the real motives behind 
such groups as Hizballah. Aum Shinrikyo's strncture, for one clearly distinguishes it 
from that of Hizballah's. Consider the cult's doctrine. It holds that, by following Shoko 
Asahara (the "father" of Aum), members would "gain supernatural powers, including the 
ability to see through walls and to levitate. An important, increasingly dominant doctrine 
of the cult dealt with the inevitability of Armageddon."54 According to David E. Kaplan, 
it was this belief in Armageddon that motivated the group's attempts to arm itself with 
51Kaplan,223. 
52 Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, ed. Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott, vol. l, Religious Extremism 
(Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997), 211. 
53 Ibid., 211. 
54 Kaplan, 208. 
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weapons of mass destruction. Its desire to speed the coming of Armageddon drove its 
biological and chemical weapons program, which began as early as 1990. It was 
financed completely by the organization itself, whose financial resources were 
substantial. For example, the cult paid a reported $100 million to electronics companies 
outside Japan.55 
Hizballah, despite being characterized as a religious organization, has 
demonstrated no such interest in Armageddon, or in speeding it up. Indeed, this goes 
against the very tenets of Islam, the official religion of much of the region, and the 
foundation upon which Hizballah would like to establish a state. It's tactics, particularly 
the practice of suicide bombings, are influenced by Shi'a Islam, the branch of Islam 
practiced by Iran. This seemingly irrational and inconceivable act is viewed by its 
practitioners as a fitting means to forward their cause and gain entrance into paradise by 
becoming martyrs in the struggle against the oppressor. This too is a cornerstone of 
Shi'ism. This is a means by which the bomber can become like Husain, grandson of 
Muhammad himself. Husain was martyred at the ancient city of Karbala, where his tiny 
resistance was wiped out by the Sunni government in power. This, according to Charles 
Lindholm, was "the great turning point in Shiite history - the equivalent to Christ's 
crucifixion for Christians."56 Husain has since taken on a mystical symbolism, one that 
has been quite useful in mobilizing in the Middle East. It was first practiced during 
Iran's 1980-1988 war with Iraq, when over 100,000 "ideologically committed" 
55 Ibid., 210. 
56 Charles Lindholm, The Islamic Middle East: An Historical Anthropology (Cambridge: Blackwell 
Publishers, Inc., 1996), 172. 
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volunteers were called into action against Iraq, "some members even carried their own 
shrouds to the front in the expectation of martyrdom."57 By mid-1982, the "war of 
attrition" began, with "human wave" attacks by these volunteers being conducted in the 
face of Iraqi artillery. It is in this spirit that extremist suicide bombers face their demise, 
without hesitation or regret. 
The mysticism of martyrdom should, however, be distinguished from the 
apocalyptic fetishes of Aum. Like the secular terrorists to which Crenshaw and Pimlott 
compare religious extremists, suicide bombings are "a means to an end," as opposed to 
"an end in itself."58 Shi'a Islam is similar to messianic Christianity, in that it preaches 
that the Hidden Thirteenth Imam will one day come, as in Christianity Christ will return 
for the believers. There is no call for believers to hurry or interfere in his return in any 
way. In fact, the Ayatollah Khomeini, upon whose principles the Hizballah bases its 
cause, was never quoted as referring to himself as the Hidden Imam. In other words, as 
violent as the group's activities are, in this context it is religion that may in fact constrain 
their desire to seek unconventional weapons. Thus, in the history of the organization, 
there has been no such act committed. This is important in our understanding of the 
motives of extremist groups, especially if we are to understand the real threat of a WMD 
attack from these groups. Other elements pertinent to our discussion of the WMD threat 
from the group may explain why there has been no nuclear, biological, or chemical attack 
conducted. 
57 Library of Congress Country Studies, "Iran - A Country Study," Library of Congress Country Studies 
Website. Online article. 2001. hnp://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/irtoc.html. 
58 Crenshaw and Pimlott, 212. 
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2. Terrorism and Chemical Weapons - Access and Operational Use 
A comparison of access and delivery of chemical weapons provides further 
argument against Crenshaw and Pimlott's definition of religious extremism, at least as it 
applies to Hizballah. We have already examined ideological differences, degree of 
operational impunity, and political relationships. Let us look more closely at access and 
feasibility of employing such weapons, based on these factors. 
Aum Shinrikyo serves as a useful case of access to such weapons. The group 
took full advantage of human resources available to it by placing emphasis on recruiting 
young scientists and technicians. Many studied at Japan's top universities, in such fields 
as medicine, biochemistry, biology, physics, and electrical engineering.59 It took 
advantage of the availability of weapons technology and know-how available in the 
former Soviet Union. It set up branches in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Vladivostok. It 
also took advantage of financial resources available to it through donations, business 
interests (including a chain of computer stores, "at least eight restaurants," training 
centers, a fitness club, trading companies, etc.), and the tax break available to religious 
organizations. Various "cover activities," such as health clinics,· manufacturing, and 
scientific research allowed it to purchase such technology with little problem. Given the 
impunity with which the group operated, access to such weapons technology also proved 
relatively easy. 
Hizballah, through its relationship with Iran, should have been able to acquire 
such weapons with little problem. There are key advantages to chemical (and biological) 
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weapons that offer incentive for their use. Consider the following advantages, offered by 
researchers at California Polytechnic State University:60 
• Detection - delivery systems can be quite rudimentary, making them 
difficult to detect. Aum placed its sarin solution into unassuming nylon 
polyethylene bags. 
• Availability - Production of such weapons is comparable to the production 
of illegal narcotics. A "moderately competent" chemist could produce 
such weapons. In the case of Hizballah, it has a ready supply of chemical 
technology from Iran, which, according to some estimates, is capable of 
producing as much as one thousand tons a year of various mustard, 
phosgene, and cyanide agents.61 
• Reputation - use of such weapons provides the necessary psychological 
effect of fear and intimidation. This provides the user with the necessary 
message that it is to be taken seriously. 
• Efficiency - as Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated, these weapons cause 
substantial casualties at very low cost, thus the term "poor man's nukes." 
So, why has Hizballah not used chemical weapons? It has certainly demonstrated 
a willingness to resort to incredible acts of violence, as illustrated by its history of 
activity. The group enjoyed its hey-day, so to speak, in the 1980s, when their attacks 
claimed the lives of numerous Americans. In April 1983, a suicide bomber destroyed the 
U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing forty-nine (sixteen American) and wounding 120 others. 
In October, a suicide bomber attacked the French and U.S. Marine Corps barracks in 
Lebanon, killing fifty-six French and 241 Americans. In November, another bomber 
59 Ibid., 213. 
60 Michael Aippin, Michael Anthony, Brent Ruehr, Barry Feather, and Danny Lee, "Chemical and iological 
Terrorism," California Polytechnic State University. Online report. http://www.calpoly.edu/-drjones/advanrages.html. 
61 Federation of American Scientists, "Chemical Weapons - Iran,'' FAS.erg. Online article. November 6, 
1998. hnp://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/cw/index.html 
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destroyed the Israeli Defense Force headquarters in Tyre, South Lebanon, killing fifty-
nine.62 Since then, the group has resorted to various tactics, including kidnappings, 
assassinations, knifings, hijackings, as well as suicide bombings. 
Ideology, constraints upon their activity by their patrons, and the proficiency of 
their military adversaries provide some deterrence to the use of WMD by Hizballah. 
Linked to these are other factors that also limit the attractiveness of such weapons. 
Consider the group's operations. Their activities have garnered them tremendous 
international media attention, which provides it with an outlet for its message and for 
recruiting and fundraising. It may fall into Crenshaw and Pimlott's category of 
organizations that "prefer the immediate, dramatic effect produced by a hijacking or a 
bombing."63 Put differently, there is little incentive to resort to a chemical attack, due to 
the effectiveness of conventional tactics. 
There are also inherent disadvantages to using weapons of mass destruction in an 
extremist attack. Consider again the California Polytechnic Institute's report:64 
• Image - as I stated earlier, there is a distinct aversion to such weapons as 
inhumane and terrible. Such an aversion could undermine group efforts at 
legitimacy (such as acting on behalf of the Palestinian people), recruiting, 
and even international funding. 
62Builta, 692. 
63 Crenshaw and Pimlott, 235. 
64 Flippin, et al, http://www.calpoly.edu/-drjones/disad.html. 
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• Acquisition - manufacturing and handling of such weapons is extremely 
dangerous, sometimes resulting in loss of life of would-be terrorists. 
Biological weapons also pose a threat to the manufacturer. According to 
terrorism analyst Jonathan B. Tucker, members of Aum "reportedly 
became infected with Q-fever, a rickettsial disease they were preparing as 
a biological weapon. Even ... Asahara is believed to have acquired the 
debilitating illness. "65 
• Retaliation - improvements in government response to terrorism 
internationally, and Israeli willingness to respond disproportionately 
specifically, poses deterrent considerations for the extremist. This is 
exacerbated by the political concerns of the state-sponsored group's 
benefactors, as the international community will often hold the state 
sponsor accountable for the activities of the extremist group. This is 
evidenced by U.S. sanctions against Iran and other "rogue states," as well 
as by Iran's own "charm offensive" with such European nations as 
Germany, which only recently re-opened diplomatic ties with Tehran 
because of terrorist activity. 
A chemical or biological attack would certainly be in keeping with Hizballah's 
desire to destroy the Israeli state, but there is another impediment to such an attack -
demography. Palestinians constitute eighteen percent of the total population of Israel -
just over one million out of a total population of 5.75 million.66 Furthermore, this 
population is spread throughout Israel, including Nazareth, Rabat, Jaffa, Tel Aviv, Haifa, 
and a significant Arab population in Jerusalem that is expected to increase substantially 
from the thirty-one percent of the current total, to about forty percent by 2020.67 
65 Jonathan B. Tucker, introduction to Toxic Terror: Ass~ssing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 7. 
66 The Arab Association for Human Rights, "The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel," HRA.org. Online 
report 2001. http://www.arabhra.org/article26/general.htrn. 
67 CNN.com, "Arab Population Outpaces Jews in Jerusalem," CNN.com, September 26, 2000. Online 
article. http:l/www.cnn.cornJ2000fWORLD/meast/09/26/mjdeast.jerusalem.reut/ 
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In other words, such an attack would be counterproductive, given the potential for 
collateral damage to sympathizers or to potential recruits. Chemical and biological 
attacks require agents in sufficient quantities or of highly virulent quality in order to 
inflict noticeable damage, and once released, they are difficult to control. An attack 
aimed at an enemy would in fact hurt members of the group's constituency. This would 
have a devastating effect on the group's image, and would minimize (or possibly destroy) 
the organizations political position. It has criticized the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization's (PLO) "concessions" to Israel and the U.S., and its stance has met with 
some agreement among Palestinians in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. Casualties 
to this constituency would provide impetus for it to move into the PLO camp, or even to 
support Israeli or U.S. action against Hizballah. 
From Iran's perspective, providing such weapons to extremist beneficiaries would 
have significant spiritual ramifications. Among Tehran's goals is to claim a leadership 
role in the Islamic world, despite the ethnic differences among Persians and Arabs. The 
collateral damage of such an attack would further alienate Tehran from the Arab Muslim 
world, dashing any hopes of such a leadership role. Where would such an attack take 
place? Virtually every inch of the country possesses religious significance, from 
Nazareth to Jerusalem. 
There is also a significant political element to such an attack. As stated, it is 
difficult to control the agent, once it has been delivered. Prevailing winds from the 
Mediterranean could risk affecting the entire region, from the West Bank or Gaza, to 
Amman, Jordan, which is only 43 miles from Jerusalem. As stated earlier, such an attack 
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by Hizballah would have potentially profound political ramifications for Tehran. This is 
the disadvantage of state-sponsored terrorism versus other types. Both sides are 
constrained by the implications of the organization's activities. This will necessarily 
drive the sponsor to circumscribe the group's activities. 
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V. CONCLUSION - REASSESSMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON 
IRAN 
As one can see, there is room for a reassessment of U.S. policy on Iran, with 
certain policy issues standing out most prominently: 
• It is inconsistent with political realities in the region. Domestic issues in 
the Middle East drive their foreign policy, and Iran has served as a symbol 
through which subversives can rally against the United States and its 
partners in the region; 
• It reflects a powerful pro-Israel lobby, and highlights the fact that 
domestic issues in the United States drive its foreign policy; and 
• It is unilateral, unpopular with our allies, and is riddled with loopholes 
whereby interested nations can bypass it without penalty. 
Iran has dramatically improved relations with Saudi Arabia since Khatami 
ascended to the presidency. He has also improved relations with Qatar, Yemen, and 
Kuwait, offering the latter a 500-kilometer pipeline that would carry water from a dam in 
Iran to the coast of Kuwait. 68 What stands out most about the recent detente between 
Iran and its neighbors is that they all share two political commonalities - apprehension 
about Israeli dominion in the Middle East, and the unpopularity of U.S. support for the 
Israeli state. Saudi Arabia has struggled with opposition movements - including terrorist 
cells - bent on removing the U.S. presence from Saudi soil. It most recently joined Syria, 
a state with which the United States just last year sought assistance in brokering peace 
between the Arabs and the Israelis, in denouncing the February 2001 U.S.-led bombing 
68 BBC News, "Iran-Kuwait Water Plan Unveiled," BBC News Network, February 22, 2001. Online article. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_ I I 84000/l I 84501.stm, I. 
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attacks on its rival, Baghdad.69 In fact, U.S. presence may have served to destabilize the 
region, as it was initially Iran to which Saudi placed blame for the terrorist bomb attacks 
against U.S. targets in Saudi Arabia in 1995-1996. Khatami has issues of his own with 
regard to the United States. He must deal with conservatives and reformists alike that 
view U.S. policy as threatening. States Geoffrey Kemp, 
For most Iranians, the ·key issues that prevent better relations with the 
United States begin with the troubled historical relationship including the 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's role in the 1953 coup that overthrew 
Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and returned the Shah to power. 
This grievance is exacerbated by the mistaken belief that the United States 
still controls billions of dollars of Iranian assets that were frozen during 
the 1979 revolution. It is compounded by the fact that the United States 
maintains sanctions on Iran's participation in energy projects in the 
Caspian Sea. Iran is also publicly critical of the strong U.S. military 
presence in the Gulf and its vigilance in preventing the Iranian 
importationof nuclear technology for peaceful uses.70 
This places constraints on how much Tehran is capable of meeting the United States half 
way, and this must be done in order for the two sides to foster a relationship that is fair, 
meaningful, and long-lasting. 
The Iran-Libya Sancti~ns Act is the product of a bill written by New York 
Senator Alfonse D' Amato, with "expert advice from the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee (AIPAC), often referred to as the voice of the Israel lobby."71 This has not 
gone unnoticed by Iran, or by more "moderate" regimes in the Middle East. In fact, the 
United States has made its support of Israel a matter of record. In its recent report on the 
69 Gulf News. ·'Saudi Arabia Joins Denunciation of Iraq Strike:· Gulf News Online. February 22, 2001. 
Online article. http://www.gulf-news.com/ Articles/news.asp? ArticleID=l 0281, I. 
70 Geoffrey Kemp, "Iran: Can the United States do a Deal?, .. The Washington Quarterly, 24:I (Winter 
2001): 112. 
71 Clawson, "Iran," 87. 
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Middle East, the Defense Department listed among its priorities for the Middle East, 
"securing a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Israel and all Arab parties," 
while at the same time proclaiming "a steadfast commitment to Israel's security and well-
being." The report singles out Iran by stating that it "especially has demonstrated a 
commitment to developing long-range ballistic missiles, which can reach deep into 
neighboring countries and to IsraeI."72 Israel's history has shown, however, that it is 
capable of defeating any Arab threat that presents itself, or any combination of threats for 
that matter. Its victory in 1948 over an Arab onslaught won it independence. In 1967, it 
defeated Egypt and Syria in six days, and caused the Arab leader Gamal Abdul Nasser to 
step down until he was asked to return to the Egyptian presidency. In 1973, it recovered 
from an Egyptian surprise attack to repel them handily. 
This is a key element in our analysis of the Middle East "neighborhood." Israel's 
own nuclear capability has deeply alarmed the Arab world. In May 1999, the member 
states of the Arab League sent a request to the International Atomic Energy Agency for it 
to include in its Forty-third General Conference an item on Israeli nuclear capabilities, 
citing Israel's unwillingness to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or to 
"place its installations under the Agency's comprehensive safeguards system, thus 
upsetting the balance needed to achieve peace in the region and exposing the region to 
nuclear risks."73 In fact, a 1998 book entitled Israel and the Bomb, by Israeli scholar 
72 Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response," 34. 
73 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities and Threat," International Atomic 
Energy Agency General Conference, May 13, 1999.Unofficial electronic version 
.http:/lwww.iaea.or.at/GC/gc43/documents/gc43-8.html, 4. 
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Avner Cohen, asserts that Israel's nuclear program goes back to the 1950s.74 According 
to Cohen, on the eve of the 1967 war, Israel put two nuclear devices on alert. He further 
asserts that the United States had knowledge of the Israeli nuclear building program, in 
the late 1950s, but then-President Eisenhower "chose to do nothing."75 This is further 
evidence that Iran may in fact not be as big a threat to stability as U.S. policy makes it out 
to be. 
As far as terrorism is concerned, indeed Iran, through state terrorism and state-
sponsored terrorism, uses violent measures to meet its political objectives. Those 
objectives could include withdrawal of American forces from the region, violent 
resistance to Israeli occupation, or a position of prestige in the Arab world. This last 
element is essential. The terrorist elements in the region are Arab. Their membership is 
Arab; their constituency is Arab; those that hold the operational reigns of power are Arab. 
This has significantly limited Iran's role in their activities, despite its sponsorship of their 
activities. In fact Iran, in its "charm offensive" with Europe and its Arab neighbors, has 
distanced itself from international terrorism aimed at those governments, and as such has 
opted for a more pragmatic approach to more moderate regimes, including Saudi Arabia; 
as such, there appears to be no overt attempts at toppling moderate governments in the 
Gulf. 
These issues further limit the lengths to which Iran will go in its sponsorship of 
terrorist groups. Assuming that states will act rationally in their international pursuits 
74 BBC News, "Middle East Book Breaks Israers Nuclear Taboo.'" BBC News Online Network, October 21, 
1998. Online article. http://news.bbc.eo.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_l 98000/J 98048.stm, 2. 
75 Ibid., 2. 
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(which this thesis does), facilitating a terrorist WMD attack in the region would prove to 
be counterproductive in this context. Still, Tehran must send a clear signal to 
Washington that it denounces terrorism in any form. It is one thing to continually dismiss 
U.S. allegations of Iranian involvement in terrorism as "propaganda"; it is another to 
make that dismissal and then host annual conferences, such as the April 2001 
international conference to support the current Palestinian uprising, featuring such 
extremist notables as Hamas, Hizballah, and the Islamic Jihad.76 
Finally, the unilateral sanctions are vulnerable. They are not popular with our 
allies, as the threat of penalties to any firm, foreign or American, which invests in Iran's 
petroleum program encroaches on their sovereignty. In fact the European Union filed 
formal complaints against the United States in the World Trade Organization following 
ILSA, forcing the U.S. to sign a Memorandum of Understanding regarding it and the 
Helms-Burton Act, which initiates sanctions against individuals and firms doing specified 
business transactions with Cuba. The Memorandum was signed in April 1997, but even 
then there was disagreement over the spirit of the Memorandum, as the EU interpreted it 
as suspending the application of ILSA and Helms-Burton, while the U.S. disagreed.77 
The European Commission warned then, "'If action against companies or waivers as 
described in the Understanding are not granted or are withdrawn, the Commission will 
76 Global Intelligence Update, "Iran Boosts Palestinian Uprising," Stratfor.com, April 26, 2001. Online 
article. hnp://www.stratfor.com/home/giu/archive/042601. 
77 Clawson, .. Iran," 91. 
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request the WTO to restart or reestablish the panel' handling the complaint."78 In fact, 
Europe has placed the United States' back against the wall in its defiance of ILSA. In 
1996 a consortium of three firms, Total of France, Gazprom of Russia, and Petronas of 
Malaysia, closed a deal to develop the South Pars oil fields of Iran, in direct violation of 
ILSA. In November 1999, Royal Dutch Shell of Great Britain made an $800 million' deal 
with the National Iranian Oil Company .to develop its Soroush and Nowruz offshore 
oilfields.79 The Total deal ended with the United States granting a "national interest" 
waiver, and the Royal Dutch Shell agreement is in its final stages. 
This is the reality, from a security perspective, of U.S. policy ·on Iran. We have 
shown that, essentially, Iran's national security goals are not the product of a radical 
regime that has been in power for the last two decades, but of a nation whose interests go 
back before its independence. It has always had border disputes with its neighbors in the 
Gulf, and it is only now, under President Khatami, that Iran has sought cooperation with 
historic adversaries. Its arms pursuits do. not appear to reflect a country building up to 
exert hegemonic influence in the region, but one reacting to a volatile environment with 
limited results. Finally, with the U.S. acting alone in the implementation of sanctions 
against Iran, it has isolated itself, not Iran. Iran has established closer ties, not only with 
its neighbors, with Europe, Russia, and Asia, in one way or another. Now is the time to 
pursue rapprochement with Iran. 
78 Ibid., 91. 
79 Robert H. Pelletreau and A. John Radsan, Esqs, "Sanctions on Iran. Iraq. Libya: Update and Analysis of 
Trends," Middle East Executive Reports 22, no. 10 (October 1999): 11. 
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APPENDIX A. COMPARISONS OF ARMS INVENTORY OF 
MAJOR GULF ARMS BUYERsso 
1. Advanced Combat Aircraft: 
Total Fixed Win2 Aircraft Modern Combat Aircraft 
Iran 304 90 
Iraq 353 81 
Saudi Arabia 432 286 
Kuwait 76 48 
Table 3: Holdings of Advanced Combat Aircraft. 
2. Advanced Armored Infantry Fighting Vessels, Reconnaissance Vehicles, Scout 
Vehicles, and Light Tanks in 2000: 
Iran-555 
Iraq-1104 
Saudi Arabia - 2385 
Kuwait-355 












1997 1998 1999 
1410 1410 1410 
2700 2700 2700 
765 810 1055 
249 249 341 
Table 4: Trends in Total Mam Battle Tank Inventory, 1995-2000. 
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APPENDIX B. GULF ARMS BUYS, 1987-1998 (2000 U.S. 
$MILLION)St 
1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 
Iran 8800 1200 1400 
Iraq 3000 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 44,800 22,300 7900 
Kuwait 3300 6200 1900 
Table 5: Arms Buys Among Leading Gulf Arms Purchasers. 
81 Ibid. 
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APPENDIX C. IRANIAN DEPENDENCE ON DECAYING 
WESTERN-SUPPLIED MAJOR WEAPONS82 
Land Forces 
Chieftain tank (140) - worn, under-armored, under-armed, underpowered. Fire control 
and sighting system now obsolete. Cooling problems. 
M-47/M-48 (150)- worn, under-armored, under-armed, and underpowered. Fire control 
and sighting system now obsolete. 
AH-11 Attack Helicopter (100) - worn, av1omcs and weapons suite now obsolete. 
Growing reliability problems due to lack of updates and parts. 
Air Force 
F-4D (35-50) - worn, avionics now obsolete. Critical problems due to lack of updates 
and parts. 
F5NB (10-20) - worn, avionics now obsolete. Serious problems due to lack of updates 
and parts. 
F-14AWX (60) - worn, avionics now obsolete. Critical problems due to lack of updates 
and parts. Cannot operate some radars at long ranges. Phoenix missile capability cannot 
be used. 
Navy 
Alvand FFG (3) - worn, weapons and electronics suites obsolete. Many systems 
inoperable or partly dysfunctional due to critical problems due to lack of updates and 
parts. 
Bayandor FF (2) - Obsolete. Critical problems due to lack of updates and parts. 
Hengemann LST (4)- worn, needs full scale re-fit. 
sz Ibid. Numbers in parentheses indicate quantity in inventory. 
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